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Abstract 
In recent decades, several countries around the world have implemented cash 
restriction policies to incentivize the use of electronic means of payments with the 
aim to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and tax evasion. This paper 
examines the impact of the proliferation in credit and debit card usage on 
consumption tax compliance using annual national level data for 26 European 
Union (EU) member states from 2000 to 2016. We measure consumption tax 
compliance using estimated Value-Added Tax (VAT) gaps, defined as the 
difference between the theoretical VAT liability according to the law and actual 
VAT collections. We exploit variation in time and space of credit and debit card 
usage across 26 EU member states from 2000-16 using panel data and instrumental 
variable techniques and find that plastic money use significantly reduces tax 
evasion while cash withdrawals appear to noticeably widen the compliance gap. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of modern means of payment 
on tax compliance by using a more adequate measure of the VAT compliance gap 
compared to earlier works and by accounting for potential confounders such as tax 
policy choices and ex ante enforcement capacity of tax administrations to curb the 
gap. 
Keywords: cash restriction policies, credit and debit card use, plastic money, 
VAT compliance gap, tax administrations 
JEL classification: H26, K42 
 
* Corresponding Author 
1 Alognon: International Center for Public Policy, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University; aalognon2@gsu.edu 
2 Koumpias: Department of Social Sciences, University of Michigan-Dearborn & Population Studies Center, 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 4901 Evergreen Rd, SSB 2300, Dearborn, MI 48128 USA; +1 
(313) 583-6555, koumpias@umich.edu 
3 Martinez-Vazquez: International Center for Public Policy, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University; jorgemartinez@gsu.edu 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Jose M. Duran-Cabre and Alejandro Esteller-More for generously 





In recent decades, several countries around the world have introduced policies to limit 
cash use and incentivize the use of electronic means of payments in order to combat money 
laundering, terrorism financing, and tax evasion. From 2005 to date, an increasing number of 
European countries have introduced upper limits to cash payments. These cash restrictions range 
from EUR 500 in Greece to EUR 15,000 in Poland. In Turkey, payments exceeding TL 8,000 
and any rental payments over TL 500 must be made through the banking system or postal 
offices. The most recent restriction is implemented by Spain, which has just lowered the limit of 
cash payments from EUR 2,500 (enacted in 2012) to EUR 1,000. In the absence of express cash 
restrictions, some countries require special reporting of cash payments. A marked example is the 
Form 8300 system in the United States, which requires that any person engaged in a trade or 
business who receives more than $10,000 in one transaction or several related transactions must 
file a cash payment report to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This system is supposedly used 
by the government to track tax evaders and individuals profiting from criminal activities. 
Given all these examples of cash restriction policies, it is of paramount importance to 
evaluate whether the belief that limiting cash transactions reduces tax evasion through increased 
use of electronic means of payments holds empirically. Has the proliferation in credit and debit 
card usage, or the use of other electronic forms of payments (“plastic money,” hereafter), 
contributed to increased compliance with the consumption tax in the European Union (EU)? The 
link between VAT compliance and plastic money is justified by the fact that plastic money is the 
primary substitute to cash, and because plastic money transactions are traceable by tax 
authorities, they are less prone to tax evasion than cash transactions. The question deserves 




excellent opportunity for tax administrations to close the consumption tax compliance gap either 
directly by bringing previously unreported transactions into the tax net or by using newly 
generated third-party information (Kleven et al., 2011).  
Between 2000 and 2016, the average share of transactions cleared via plastic money in 
the 26 EU countries increased from EUR 34.6 billion to EUR 111.9 billion. In terms of nominal 
GDP, this represents a growth from 9.3% to 19.5%. At the same time, tax administrations in the 
EU, indeed around the world, have implemented a number of innovations aiming to capture 
“hard-to-tax” tax bases, which would appear have improved overall tax compliance but which 
have also confounded the potential impact of the shift in consumer preference in favor of plastic 
money. Therefore, up to now it remains unclear how important the role of plastic money has 
been in narrowing the observed tax compliance gap in the EU. Obtaining an answer to this 
question would be helpful also to other countries, especially developing countries, struggling 
with tax enforcement issues. 
 The seminal paper by Pomeranz (2015) on the importance of third-party information in 
the context of the VAT establishes the first-order deterrence effect of the paper trail generated by 
transactions between firms in Chile. Some other works also investigated this research question. 
First, Madzharova (2014) studied the impact of cash and card transactions on VAT collection 
efficiency in the European Union (EU) member states from 2000 to 2010 and found no 
statistically significant effect of card payments on tax revenue performance. Second, 
Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2018) analyzed the effect of card payments on VAT 
revenue in 19 European Monetary Union (EMU) countries using panel quarterly information 
from 2003 to 2016. These authors find that a larger share of card payments in private 




Russo (2018) find some evidence of a positive effect of credit and debit card payments on VAT 
compliance while they show that ATM cash withdrawals increase VAT evasion. 
The first contribution of this study, relative to Madzharova (2014) and Hondroyiannis 
and Papaoikonomou (2018), lies in the use of a less broad measure of VAT gap that is much 
more closely related to tax compliance. First, the dependent variable or observed outcome in our 
analysis is the VAT compliance gap as opposed to the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) and VAT 
revenue used in pre-existing literature. This is computed as the difference between expected and 
realized tax revenues and may be interpreted as foregone tax revenues net of parameters that 
determine expected tax revenues such as tax rates.1 The VAT compliance gap is less susceptible 
to the inclusion or exclusion of observable factors that can be accounted for (manipulation bias) 
as well as unobservable confounding variation from other factors that influence revenue 
collection, such as changes in tax administration quality or enforcement capacity, which we may 
fail to capture fully (omitted variable bias), or partly (measurement error). The fact that our 
outcome is pre-determined by the reports of the Directorate General for Taxation and Customs 
Unions (DG TAXUD) safeguards against the arbitrary choice of explanatory variables that 
would introduce manipulation bias into our results. Furthermore, even observable factors such as 
exemptions and zero-rates cannot be easily accounted for when using aggregate (national) level 
data. In the prior literature, these correlations had been relegated to the error term leading to 
omitted variable bias, whereas in our study, they are captured by the outcome variable by 
definition. Even though Immordino and Russo (2018) employ appropriate measures of VAT 
                                                 
1 The estimated VAT gaps are defined as the difference between expected VAT revenues according to the law and 
actual VAT collections. This includes “foregone VAT revenue from to tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. 





compliance gap, they estimate the effect of one means of payment at a time without accounting 
for variations in the other means of transactions. Besides, they do not control for public 
authorities’ efforts toward reducing the gap, which may blur their estimates. These potential 
causes of omitted variable bias can cloud their estimates. Finally, with the availability of more 
recent data, it seems necessary to assess whether their findings are stable over time since the last 
observation in their analysis dates back to 2012. 
 We exploit variation in time and space of credit and debit card usage across 26 EU 
member states from 2000-16 using panel data and instrumental variable techniques to identify 
the effect of plastic money on VAT compliance. We find that an increase in the share of plastic 
money used for consumption expenditures is associated with a significant decrease in the VAT 
gap. The policy implications of our results are twofold. First, they highlight the role that supply-
side innovations such as the use of plastic money can play in assisting the compliance efforts of 
tax administrations around the world with limited capacity. Second, they demonstrate the 
limitations of some forms of third party reporting in improving consumption tax compliance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section succinctly reviews 
the broad literature on the determinants of VAT compliance as well as the specific literature on 
the effect of plastic money on VAT compliance. The third section describes the data, provides 
some key summary statistics and delineates the empirical framework. The fourth section presents 
and discusses the results, while the last section concludes. 
Literature Review 
Several studies have empirically examined the economic, social and institutional 
determinants of VAT compliance. While some studies analyzed the determinants of VAT 




comparing the results of these two groups of studies because VAT revenues and VRR reflect not 
only the effect of non-compliance but also the impact of policy choices on tax structure such as 
exemptions, reduced rates on certain transactions, etc. We first review studies on the 
determinants of VAT compliance gap to circumscribe the universe of potential control variables 
and then focus on papers that investigate the effect of card payments on VAT revenue or 
measures of VAT efficiency. 
In a pioneering work, albeit limited in statistical power and econometric methodology 
from the present perspective, Agha and Haughton (1996) constructed an index of VAT 
compliance for a cross-section of 17 OECD countries in 1987 and regressed it on characteristics 
of the countries and their VAT rates. The index was set as the ratio of actual VAT to potential 
VAT, analogous to the VRR. They find that a higher VAT rate is associated with lower 
compliance, and that compliance is considerably lower with multiple VAT rates. The study also 
suggests that VAT compliance increases the longer VAT has been introduced. 
Studying the factors that determine VAT fraud in Italy from 1982 to 2001, Otranto, 
Pisano and Polidoro (2003) find that VAT evasion is positively affected by variables such as the 
GDP, the share of the fiscal burden, and the ratio of gross profits over value added. However, it 
is negatively associated with the number of taxpayers audited in the previous year by public 
authorities. Christie and Holzner (2006) examine data for 29 European countries over the period 
2000-2003. Their analysis reveals that higher VAT rates reduce VAT compliance whereas 
greater judicial and legal effectiveness improve compliance. 
Another seminal study devised to quantify and analyze the VAT gap was the one 
commissioned by the Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Unions (DG TAXUD) of 




between the estimated VAT compliance gap and some economic and institutional variables, the 
report reveals that VAT gaps were significantly higher in countries with higher perceived levels 
of corruption. However, the study does not find robust statistical evidence of an association 
between the compliance gap and economic variables such as the sectoral composition of the 
economy, the GDP per capita, the level of taxation (VAT standard rate and theoretical VAT 
liability as a proportion of GDP), etc. One methodological issue with the Reckon report is that it 
relies on a random effect estimator, which assumes that unobserved country-specific differences 
that determine taxpayer compliance are random and thus uncorrelated to the explanatory 
variables of interest. This approach may suffer from omitted variable bias and is therefore 
unlikely to produce reliable estimates of the determinants of the VAT gap. Aware of this possible 
limitation, the recent study commissioned by the DG TAXUD and conducted by the Center for 
Social and Economic Research (CASE) used a fixed effect estimation technique to quantify and 
analyze the drivers of the VAT compliance in European countries. The final report released in 
2018 suggests that the productive structure of the economy affects the VAT compliance gap with 
the biggest effect due to the retail sector. This means that the larger the share of the retail sale 
sector in the economy, the larger is the gap. It also reveals a positive correlation between 
unemployment as a proxy of liquidity constraints and the level of the compliance gap. However, 
the report does not find a consistent effect of the scale of the tax administration on the VAT 
compliance gap. From the regressions that include subsets of the explanatory variables, the 
authors find that higher administration costs lead to lower compliance gaps. However, once all 
the explanatory variables are introduced in the regression analysis, the study finds a positive, U-
shaped association between the scale of the tax administration and the compliance gap, 




threshold and then become productive. This last finding seems counterintuitive and will be tested 
in this study. 
Turning to studies that examined the effect of card payments on VAT revenue or VAT 
efficiency measures, a few works closer to this paper are those by Madzharova (2014), 
Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2017, 2018), and Immordino and Russo (2018). 
Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2017) analyze the effect of card payments on VAT revenue 
after Greek authorities imposed restrictions on cash withdrawals in July 2015. They find that a 1-
percentage point increase in the share of credit card payments in private consumption results in 
approximately 1-percent increase in VAT revenue. In their 2018 paper, the authors examine the 
relationship using quarterly panel data for the 19 Euro area economies from 2003-16 and find 
that increasing the share of credit card payments in private consumption expenditure improves 
VAT revenue in the area. Moreover, they show that gains from increased credit card use are 
decreasing in baseline card use and revenue efficiency levels while increasing in the share of 
self-employed individuals in the labor force. The largest gains are reported for Greece and Italy. 
Earlier on, Madzharova (2014) investigates the impact of cash and card transactions on VAT 
collection efficiency in the European Union member states from 2000 to 2010 and finds no 
statistically significant effect of card payments on tax revenue performance but shows that cash 
usage has a consistent negative effect on VAT efficiency. A serious potential concern with those 
studies is that they use observed VAT revenue or VRR as their measure of tax revenue efficiency 
without controlling in their estimations for contemporaneous tax policy changes such as 
exemptions, reduced rates or zero-rates on certain transactions, the enforcement capacity of the 
tax administration, etc. Some of these factors cannot even be easily accounted for when using 




reported in these papers. In fact, tax fraud and tax evasion account for only a fraction of the 
entire VAT gap. The remaining portion of the total gap is due to tax structure policy decisions – 
the legal gap – which varies widely across space and time. In a nutshell, by using improper 
measures of tax compliance efficiency, these studies are limited in tracing out the effect of 
plastic money on tax compliance since the policy gap varies widely within a country and across 
countries. In this respect, Madzharova herself acknowledges that, ideally, one should use the 
compliance ratio. She however noted that this “entails the calculation of the theoretical tax 
revenue from actual tax law, or VAT revenue under full compliance, which is a daunting task, 
inevitably prone to error.” That said, the present paper has the comparative advantage of using 
VAT compliance gaps computed through the joint effort of a dozen research institutions in the 
framework of the study commissioned by the DG TAXUD in 2015 on the VAT gap in the EU 
member states. The latest paper that investigates this question is from Immordino and Russo 
(2018). Even though these authors use appropriate measures of VAT compliance gap, the fact 
that they evaluate the effect of one means of payments (either cash or card) at a time while 
abstracting from the other means of transactions can pose the problem of omitting a relevant 
regressor given that the two types of transactions are strongly correlated. In fact, economic 
agents do not perform only card payments or only cash transactions. The majority of agents does 
both, and both are present at the same time in the economy and are related (complements or 
substitutes). Hence, the effect of the use of one means of payments on the compliance gap should 
be conditional on the use of the other one. That said, this study can also suffer from omitted 
variable bias even if it analyzes the right outcomes. Moreover, the authors also fail to account for 
ex ante efforts made by public authorities to reduce the VAT gap, which can cast doubt on their 




restriction policies in order to curb the gap. This can lead, once again, to omitted variable bias 
issue in their analysis. Finally, our study provides a robustness check of Immordino and Russo 
(2018) by extending the sample size to more recent country observations. 
Data and Empirical Analysis 
This section first describes the data utilized in this study and presents some key summary 
statistics on VAT compliance gap and plastic money use in the EU. Then it discusses the 
methodology employed to tease out the effect of plastic money use on the compliance gap. 
Data 
The data utilized in this study stem from several sources and cover the period 2000 to 
2016. Our empirical exercise focuses on the effect of proliferation in credit and debit card use on 
consumption tax compliance, namely VAT compliance. The measures of VAT gap utilized are 
the VAT gap in EUR, the VAT gap as share of GDP, and the VAT gap as share of Value-Added 
Total Tax Liability (VTTL), which proceed from the 2013 and 2018 final reports on the VAT gap 
in the European Union member states (TAXUD, 2018). These data are available for all the 26 
countries from 2000 to 2016.  
Our first key explanatory variable is the value of card transactions by all cards issued in 
the reporting country as a share of GDP. Card payments cover the period 2000-16 for all the 
countries but Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and Slovakia for which they are available from 2001, and 
Spain where they stem from 2002. The second main regressor is the ratio of cash withdrawals to 
GDP. The GDP data proceed from Eurostat database, while card payments and cash transactions 
are drawn from the European Central Bank (ECB) data warehouse. A more precise proxy for 




counter (OTC), and point-of-sale (POS) cash withdrawals. However, there are a lot of missing 
values on these variables for each country at different points in time. Hence, the total cash 
transactions constructed as the sum of ATM, OTC, and POS withdrawals may not be a good 
proxy for cash transactions. Therefore, we use ATM cash withdrawals (pertaining to cards issued 
in the reporting country), which have less missing observations to approximate cash transactions. 
We also obtain from the ECB information on the number of ATM per million inhabitants. 
Expected efforts made by the tax administration to close the VAT gap ex ante can also 
have a deterrent effect on private agents’ tax compliance behavior. These efforts can be driven 
by the scale of the tax administration (measured as the ratio of total administrative costs over 
GDP), the share of information and technology expenditures in total administrative costs, as well 
as the level of public indebtedness measured by the ratio of public deficit to GDP. We therefore 
account for these 3 variables to proxy the effect of the tax administration on voluntary tax 
compliance, controlling for them in a lagged form to reflect expectations. The data on the scale 
of the tax administration and IT expenditures stem from the OECD data bank while the ratio of 
public deficit to GDP comes from Eurostat. 
One factor supposed to shape tax morale, and thus potentially tax compliance, is age 
structure. In fact, the literature on tax morale finds that older people exhibit higher tax morale, 
which is commonly explained as they being more aware of the benefits of adopting a prosocial 
behavior (Leonardo et al., 2016). The variable used to proxy tax morale is the share of people 
over 50 years old in the population obtained from Eurostat database. In addition, the less 
effective use of public resources by the government, the perception of private economic agents 
about the poor performance of public authorities, and liquidity constraints can create incentives 




government, this paper utilizes the World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator. Besides, 
we control for the unemployment rate obtained from Eurostat to proxy for liquidity constraints 
and the business cycle. We also account for over time cross-country differences in payment 
habits that depend on the level of economic development by controlling for the GDP per capita. 
Tax evasion can also depend on the productive structure of the economy in the sense that some 
sectors (like wholesale and retail trade) may be more prone to tax evasion than others (like real 
estate). Therefore, we control for the percentage share of the following sectors in the gross value-
added (VA): wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities 
(probably the key sector subject to tax evasion), as well as real estate, construction, industry, 
information and communication, and art and entertainment. Sectors that are exempted from 
VAT, namely health, education, or financial services, are excluded. These series as well as those 
on GDP per capita and population size are obtained from the Eurostat data bank. Finally, private 
agents’ tax compliance behavior can be affected by prevailing VAT rates. However, VAT rates 
do not change very often. Hence, their impact on the compliance gap would be subsumed in 
country-specific heterogeneities. Following the 2018 TAXUD report, we control instead for the 
dispersion of tax rates (within a country), which provide incentives and opportunities for 
evasion, and the information for which was generously provided by the authors of the 2018 
TAXUD report. Some of the control variables also record missing values for some countries in 





Table 1 below shows the percent changes in VAT gaps and plastic money use between 
2000 and 2016 in each study country.2 Despite substantial heterogeneity across countries, it 
provides first evidence of a negative correlation between VAT gaps and plastic money use. For 
example, the countries with the largest increases in plastic money use (Romania, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Slovakia) all recorded substantial VAT gap reductions over the period of analysis. 
This association could also be the consequence of third factors that jointly impacted VAT gaps 
and plastic money use. Nevertheless, it highlights the fact that the proliferation of plastic money 
coincided with a reduction in VAT gaps. The last column of the table indicates whether a 
country is classified as a Central and Eastern European (CEE) country according to the OECD. 
Table 1: Changes in VAT Gap and Plastic Money Use over Time 
Country 
Plastic 
money use in 
1st year (% of 
GDP) 
Plastic money 
use in last 
year (% of 
GDP) 
% change in 
plastic money 
use 
VAT gap in 
1st year (% of 
GDP) 
VAT gap in 
last year (% 
of GDP) 




Austria 3.7 10.0 174.1 0.8 0.3 -62.5 No 
Belgium 10.0 19.3 92.6 0.7 0.7 0.0 No 
Bulgaria 0.4 6.6 1474.2 2.5 1.4 -44.0 Yes 
Czech Rep. 1.1 10.6 837.4 2.6 1.2 -53.8 Yes 
Denmark 11.8 28.6 142.9 1.2 0.9 -25.0 No 
Estonia 3.8 23.8 527.3 1.2 0.7 -41.7 Yes 
Finland 10.3 21.2 106.3 1.2 0.8 -33.3 No 
France 10.3 22.0 112.9 1.0 0.9 -10.0 No 
Germany 5.2 8.2 57.7 0.9 0.7 -22.2 No 
Greece 2.2 8.7 298.5 2.4 3.4 41.7 No 
Hungary 1.4 11.2 697.3 2.5 1.4 -44.0 Yes 
Ireland 5.4 15.0 181.2 0.7 0.6 -14.3 No 
Italy 3.9 10.3 163.4 1.9 2.1 10.5 No 
Latvia 3.3 18.4 456.4 1.3 1.0 -23.1 Yes 
Lithuania 0.8 12.1 1356.5 3.3 2.6 -21.2 Yes 
Luxembourg 8.5 15.9 85.9 1.0 0.1 -90.0 No 
Malta 3.4 15.1 349.7 1.1 0.2 -81.8 No 
                                                 
2 For all countries but Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Spain, data on plastic money use are available from 




Netherlands 9.4 17.8 89.5 0.7 0.3 -57.1 No 
Poland 1.3 11.8 806.5 1.4 1.9 35.7 Yes 
Portugal 11.3 38.0 236.7 0.3 1.0 233.3 No 
Romania 0.1 6.3 9357.6 4.6 3.6 -21.7 Yes 
Slovakia 1.2 15.5 1148.2 2.6 2.3 -11.5 Yes 
Slovenia 7.5 12.9 70.9 0.3 0.7 133.3 Yes 
Spain 9.5 13.2 39.5 0.4 0.2 -50.0 No 
Sweden 8.8 22.9 158.8 0.5 0.1 -80.0 No 
UK 15.9 45.6 187.2 0.9 1.0 11.1 No 
 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of VAT gaps – the dependent variable – and plastic 
money use – the independent variable of interest – for CEE and non-CEE countries. 
Figure 1: Evolution of VAT Gap and Card Payments in CEE and Non-CEE Countries  
 
Notes: Card payments cover the period 2000-2016 for all countries but Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and Slovakia (2001-
2016), and Spain (2002-2016). 
Plastic money use in non-CEE countries was higher to that of CEE countries by 
approximately 1 percent in GDP terms. Plastic money use evolved steadily over the period 2000-
16 with no discernible difference in the growth rates across groups of countries, such that the 




percentage of GDP exhibited more variance, as VAT gap recorded sizable increases from 2008-
11 and which were more exaggerated in CEE countries. This coincided with the EU public debt 
crisis that might have put pressure on tax administrations toward increasing tax revenues. Thus, 
the subsequent steep decline in VAT gap could be interpreted as the response to the public debt 
crisis by governments around the EU in the form of stronger tax enforcement. This is a potential 
confounder of our estimation results. Our regression model therefore controls for changes in 
public deficits as well as ex-ante endeavors of tax administrations to curb the compliance gap. 
The sample of CEE countries also recorded an increase in the VAT gap in 2001, which could be 
linked to contagion effects from the 2001 financial crisis in Russia and also contribute to blur the 
estimation results. In the econometric framework, we account for this by including in the 
regressions year fixed heterogeneities that differentially affect CEE countries relative to their 
non-CEE counterparts. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that our regression results are robust to 
the inclusion of CEE country-by-year fixed effects. 
Empirical strategy 
To identify the effect of plastic money on VAT compliance, this study exploits 
spatiotemporal variations in credit/debit card usage over time across different EU member states 
in a fixed effect (FE) panel regression framework. An advantage of the FE estimation technique 
is that it allows country-specific time-invariant unobservables to be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. The econometric model can be specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊1𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝑊2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊1𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽4𝑊2𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜶 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑖 denotes the country, and 𝑡 represents the year; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the outcome (VAT gap, 




variable, defined as the logged total value of residents’ card payments as share of GDP; 𝑊2𝑖𝑡 
represents the logged ATM cash withdrawals as share of GDP; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes the set of control 
variables (incentives created by the tax administration, government effectiveness, productive 
structure of the economy, tax morale, GDP per capita, etc.) discussed above in the next 
subsection. We include these regressors as they have been pre-identified as determinants of VAT 
gaps in the literature (TAXUD, 2018). Some control variables, namely cash withdrawals as share 
of GDP, population and GDP per capita, enter the model in their logarithm form. We test for a 
non-linear relationship between some regressors (cash withdrawals over GDP, card payments 
over GDP, scale of the tax administration, and IT expenditures) and the outcomes by including 
their quadratic terms in the models. However, for brevity, only some control variables are shown 
in the regression tables. (The full regression results are available upon request.) To reflect 
expectations, the scale of the tax administration and IT expenditures are lagged. The term 
𝜇𝑖 captures time-invariant country-specific heterogeneities that affect tax compliance, while 𝜏𝑡 
accounts for year-specific effects such as macroeconomic factors that affect indifferently tax 
compliance in the European economies under study; 𝜖𝑖𝑡 represents the idiosyncratic disturbance, 
while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 identify respectively the effect of plastic money use and cash transactions on tax 
compliance. 
 A potential concern with the model specified by equation (1) is that the choice to use a 
specific means of transactions may be endogenous to tax evasion. In fact, as noted by Immordino 
and Russo (2017, 2018), the seller might offer a price discount to the buyer in exchange for 
paying cash, which incentivizes tax evasion. Therefore, we should observe more cash 
transactions where this form of collaborative tax evasion is more widespread (see Immordino 




instrumental variable (IV) approach. Following these authors, we instrument card and cash 
payments by the number of ATM per capita and the number of fixed broadband internet 
connections per inhabitant. In fact, these variables can easily be thought as determining card and 
cash transactions without directly affecting tax evasion. We refer the reader to Immordino and 
Russo (2018) for any theoretical justification regarding the relevance of these instruments. We 
consider as additional instrument the interaction term of these two instruments. Once again, a 
major difference with Immordino and Russo (2018) lies in the fact that the authors considered 
one means of payments at a time, yet both can be endogenous. Hence, in the first stage, both the 
logged card payments and cash withdrawals as share of GDP are regressed on the set of 
instruments and control variables (excluding scale of the tax administration and IT expenditures 
but including country and year unobserved heterogeneities). 
 For the IV technique to be valid, a battery of tests needs to be performed. First, one needs 
to test if the instruments are valid, i.e., if they are uncorrelated with the error process in the 
structural equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hansen J statistic of 
overidentification test casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. Second, we need to check if 
the instruments are relevant, i.e., if they are sufficiently strong in predicting the endogenous 
regressors. This is obtained through the test of weak identification which compares a Wald-type 
F statistic to critical values tabulated by Stock-Yogo (2005). A rejection of the null hypothesis 
suggests that the model is not weakly identified. Since we allow for heteroskedastic errors, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is no longer valid, and one needs to use instead the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rank F statistic. This test is important because in the presence of weak instruments, 
the loss of precision is severe, and IV estimates may even perform more poorly than the ones 




potentially endogenous regressors should be treated as exogenous given the instruments. Under 
homoskedasticity, this is equivalent to the Hausman test of IV estimates versus OLS estimates. 
To account for possible bias in conventional estimated standard errors of regression 
coefficients, we compute robust standard errors, which allow for serial within-country 
correlation in the data. 
Results 
Data show a strong correlation between card payments and cash withdrawals. Therefore, 
as stressed earlier, Immordino and Russo (2018) potentially suffers an omitted variable bias issue 
since the effect of one means of payments on tax compliance is estimated without accounting for 
the other means. We then examine a regression model that accounts for both means of 
transactions as well as tax enforcement endeavors of public administrations. Table 2 below 
displays the results of the cross-country fixed effect panel regressions. We consider three 
different variations of the outcome, VAT gap. In columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), the 
dependent variables are respectively the logarithm of the VAT gap, the VAT gap as percent of 
GDP and the VAT gap as percent of VTTL. Our preferred outcome variable is the VAT gap as 
share of GDP since we can similarly normalize the key independent variable by GDP. Columns 
(2), (4), and (6) report the estimates of regressions that include the size of the shadow economy 
rather than ATM cash withdrawals. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the regression results when 
we include an indicator for CEE countries and its interaction with card payment transactions as 
additional explanatory variables. Note that the CEE dummy is absent from the reported results 





Table 2: Fixed-effect Panel Regression Estimates of VAT gap on Plastic Money Use and All 
the Control Variables 
  Log(VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP VAT gap as % of VTTL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) -0.0553 -1.1755 -0.4587 -0.6961 2.3568 -7.7430 
 (0.529) (0.708) (0.776) (0.913) (7.270) (6.695) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) squared 0.0297 -0.1339 -0.2489 -0.2233 -0.4717 -2.0233 
 (0.117) (0.122) (0.167) (0.186) (1.721) (1.393) 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 3.4765**  2.7128**  35.0636**  
 (1.505)  (1.241)  (12.613)  
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 
squared 0.7002**  0.5783**  7.0499***  
 (0.296)  (0.220)  (2.297)  
Size of the shadow economy  -0.1153*  -0.0414  -0.9555 
  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.563) 
Share (%) of whole and retail sale in VA 0.0137 -0.0320 0.0917 0.0540 0.8464 0.4568 
 (0.064) (0.045) (0.082) (0.074) (0.703) (0.641) 
Share (%) of real estate in VA -0.0899* -0.1063** -0.0730 -0.1217 -1.2876* -1.3382* 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.072) (0.082) (0.684) (0.716) 
Share (%) of arts in VA 0.1086 0.1701** 0.2372*** 0.2507*** 1.4238* 2.0410** 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.060) (0.071) (0.743) (0.733) 
Dispersion of tax rates -2.8626 -0.4246 3.4746 4.2930 16.2539 31.0421 
 (2.527) (2.378) (4.352) (4.206) (32.814) (34.862) 
Unemployment rate (15-74 years) 0.0693 0.0948** 0.0988** 0.1256*** 1.0172*** 1.2157*** 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.318) (0.319) 
Government effectiveness index -0.5951 -0.8134 -0.1988 -0.4402 -3.9275 -6.7699 
 (0.546) (0.526) (0.394) (0.341) (4.188) (4.003) 
Age structure 0.0374 -0.0578 0.1356* 0.0185 1.2861* 0.3272 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.076) (0.084) (0.709) (0.835) 
Lagged IT expenditures 3.3629 2.5666 -0.6248 -1.3459 -21.3207 -34.7636 
 (2.362) (2.677) (3.488) (3.122) (29.015) (28.229) 
Lagged scale of the tax administration 891.3981 -111.4967 905.6849 53.4335 6,220.1269 -205.3619 
 (646.483) (136.244) (827.461) (170.491) (7,180.280) (1,680.717) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0301 -0.0363 -0.0155 -0.0201 -0.1598 -0.2859 
 (0.035) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.254) (0.192) 
Log(GDP per capita) 2.6903** 2.3090**  0.6824 17.4242 12.1635 
 (1.219) (0.999)  (0.970) (10.661) (9.623) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.461 0.405 0.486 0.408 0.516 0.438 
Observations 194 190 194 190 194 190 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, 
share of telecommunications in VA, lagged IT expenditures squared, lagged scale of the tax administration squared, 





The estimates suggest a non-linear negative relationship between the VAT gap and 
plastic money use, but one that is not precisely estimated. Increased use of card payment means 
is associated with lower VAT gaps which are reduced at a decreasing rate. Specifically, the 
estimated coefficients of logged total card payments by GDP have the expected negative sign 
across almost all the specifications but are not statistically significant. This overall result is 
consistent with Madzharova (2014) and the OLS results of Immordino and Russo (2018) who 
find no impact of card payments on VAT collection efficiency. However, this result is not in line 
with Hondroyiannis and Papaoikonomou (2018) who find that the share of card payments in 
private consumption expenditure improves VAT tax compliance in the 19 Euro area economies.  
In addition, we find that ATM cash withdrawals contribute to increased VAT gaps, as 
expected, in a statistically significant way. These results are robust to all three measures of VAT 
gap employed, i.e., logarithm of VAT gap, VAT gap as a percentage of GDP and VAT gaps as a 
percentage of VTTL. This result also corroborates Madzharova (2014) and Immordino and 
Russo (2018) who show that VAT revenue collection decreases with increase in cash use. 
However, as extensively discussed earlier, our findings are not directly comparable to these 
previous works because they were interested in the effect of card payments on broader measures 
of VAT revenue collection efficiency rather than VAT compliance gap per se or because the 
underlying model differs from ours. 
It also appears that the productive structure of the economy is a key determinant of tax 
compliance. In fact, the OLS estimates show that an increased share of the real estate sector in 
the total value added of the economy is associated with lower VAT gaps or VAT gaps as a 
percentage of VTTL. This could be explained by the fact that real estate transactions typically 




actually outlawed. Moreover, those transactions involve extensive paper trail in the form of 
contracts and land registration. On the other hand, an increased share of the arts industry in the 
total value added of the economy translates into higher VAT gaps. Following the same 
reasoning, this is also expected given that this industry is comprised of self-employed individuals 
and does not necessarily generate a significant paper trail, if any. Moreover, art purchases are a 
customary avenue for tax evasion and money laundering; so much so that the European 
Parliament issued regulations that would gradually eliminate the system of “freeports” (venues 
that store art and other valuable tax-free) in its efforts to combat tax evasion (Korver, 2018).3  
Next, we find that the unemployment rate has a large, positive and very precise 
association with all measures of VAT gap. Again, this is not surprising given that the 
unemployment rate is directly related to the size of the shadow economy which has been 
typically found to increase tax evasion and thus the tax compliance gap. Lastly, the naïve OLS 
estimates suggest a positive and somehow statistically significant relationship between the GDP 
per capita and the level VAT gap. However, this is not confirmed when using the VAT gap as 
share of VTTL. It is not immediately obvious why; a potential explanation might be that 
increased per capita income would lead to more consumption spending and, thus, to increased 
opportunities to evade a consumption tax such as the VAT. Nevertheless, this striking finding 
needs to be documented by future research. 
Some control variables such as the lagged scale of the tax administration and the lagged 
IT expenditures record quite a few missing values. Because they are not statistically significant 
                                                 
3 News article: news.artnet.com/art-world/eu-calls-scrap-freeports-1507435 
European Parliament technical report: www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/162244/P8_TAPROV(2019)0240.pdf 





(Table 2), we drop them from the list of regressors and estimate a nearly balanced panel 
regression model to improve the sample size, hence the precision of the estimates. Table 3 shows 
the results of this exercise. 
Table 3: Fixed-effect Panel Regression Estimates of VAT Gap on Plastic Money Use and a 
Subset of Control Variables 
  Log(VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP 
VAT gap as % of 
VTTL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) 0.3060 -0.1540 1.0818* 0.8290 11.2173* 9.9840 
 (0.466) (0.482) (0.607) (0.720) (5.546) (6.726) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) squared 0.0343 -0.0337 0.1189 0.0708 1.3982 1.0624 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.107) (0.110) (0.989) (1.034) 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 3.3494***  2.7061**  30.7088***  
 (0.897)  (1.041)  (9.131)  
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 
squared 0.6909***  0.5454***  6.4030***  
 (0.185)  (0.184)  (1.634)  
Size of the shadow economy  -0.1065**  -0.0063  -0.2105 
  (0.047)  (0.044)  (0.460) 
Share (%) of whole and retail sale in VA -0.0148 -0.0463 -0.0642 -0.0807 -0.0178 -0.2735 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.046) (0.048) (0.319) (0.334) 
Share (%) of real estate in VA -0.0978 -0.0878 -0.0610 -0.0486 -0.6798 -0.5288 
 (0.068) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.561) (0.598) 
Share (%) of arts in VA -0.0893 -0.0439 -0.0091 0.0215 -0.4700 -0.0887 
 (0.062) (0.056) (0.047) (0.056) (0.481) (0.539) 
Dispersion of tax rates -2.7909 -2.0648 0.3384 1.5624 -2.3190 8.5301 
 (1.856) (1.735) (2.191) (2.054) (20.669) (19.479) 
Unemployment rate 0.0334* 0.0539** 0.0616* 0.0606* 0.5874** 0.5928** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.244) (0.253) 
Age structure 0.1116* 0.0558 0.2041*** 0.1606*** 1.5998** 1.2173** 
 (0.062) (0.045) (0.058) (0.056) (0.581) (0.519) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0343* -0.0256 -0.0381* -0.0330 -0.3628* -0.3158 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.188) (0.189) 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.1575*** 0.6318   5.1300 0.0172 
 (0.402) (0.599)   (4.319) (6.124) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.366 0.348 0.380 0.306 0.372 0.275 
Observations 371 364 371 364 371 364 




Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, 
share of telecommunications in VA, log(population) and the constant term. Robust standard errors appear in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Once again, the naïve OLS estimates show that plastic money use does not have a 
consistent significant effect on tax compliance while cash withdrawals appear to increase the 
VAT compliance gap. 
 To tackle the aforementioned potential endogeneity issue, we resort to an IV approach 
using the prevalence of ATM and broadband internet connections in a country as well as their 
interaction term as instruments for the two means of payment. Given that IV estimators are 
intrinsically biased, they perform poorly in small samples. Therefore, we consider for the IV 
approach the same subset of control variables used in Table 3 in order to get rid of variables with 
a lot of missing observations and thus increase the sample size. Table 4A in the Appendix 
displays the results of the first stage regressions and the identification tests. The Hansen J test of 
overidentification fails to reject the null hypothesis of overidentification of the models in the first 
and second columns at the conventional critical level of 5 percent. This suggests that the 
instruments are valid. Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistics compared to the 
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values suggest that the instruments, particularly for 
estimates in columns (1), are relatively strong. Finally, the endogeneity tests conditional on the 
instruments reject in all the cases the exogeneity of plastic money use and cash transactions, and 
therefore IV estimates should be preferred. The following table shows the results of the second 





Table 4: Second Stage FE IV Regression of VAT Gap on Predicted Plastic Money Use and 
Cash Withdrawals 
  VAT gap as % of GDP VAT gap as % of VTTL 
      
Log(Card payments over GDP) -0.5029* -9.3959*** 
 (0.264) (3.274) 
Log(Cash withdrawals over GDP) 0.6524*** 6.6291*** 
 (0.210) (1.879) 
Share (%) of whole and retail sale in VA -0.0495 0.0962 
 (0.034) (0.287) 
Share (%) of real estate in VA -0.0642* -0.7901** 
 (0.037) (0.360) 
 (0.077) (0.792) 
Share (%) of arts in VA 0.0534 0.3801 
 (0.066) (0.651) 
Dispersion rate 3.5358*** 29.1839* 
 (1.309) (15.605) 
Unemployment rate 0.0332** 0.2666* 
 (0.016) (0.157) 
Age structure 0.0669 0.1857 
 (0.048) (0.456) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0307** -0.2738* 
 (0.015) (0.140) 
Log(Population) -1.2178 -22.6007 
 (1.412) (13.774) 
Log(GDP per capita)  4.5467 
  (3.896) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.241 0.096 
Observations 399 399 
Number of countries 25 25 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, 
share of telecommunications in VA. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Contrary to the naïve OLS estimates, it appears that card payments reduce tax evasion. 
The IV results also corroborate the OLS ones regarding the effect of cash transactions on VAT 
compliance. We report that cash withdrawals foster indeed tax evasion and widens the VAT gap. 





There is evidence that card payments’ traceability could enhance VAT compliance by 
increasing the perceived probability of detection by the tax authorities, which enhances the 
VAT’s deterrence effect (Pomeranz, 2015). This paper investigates the effect of payment 
methods on valued-added tax compliance in EU countries. It differs from the earlier works first 
by considering a more appropriate measure of the compliance gap that nets out the policy gap; 
that is, the entire gap is not made up of tax fraud or evasion. Therefore, a concern with these 
previous studies is the use of VAT revenue or VRR as a measure of tax revenue efficiency 
without controlling in the regressions for the effect of policy choices on tax structure, the 
enforcement capacity of the tax administration, etc. Some of these factors cannot even be easily 
accounted for when using aggregate level data, possibly leading to omitted variable bias issue in 
the estimates of these papers. Second, even though one of the previous works used the 
appropriate measures of VAT gap, it examines the effect of one means of payment at a time, a 
potential for omitted variable bias. In addition, using adequate measures of VAT compliance gap 
along with more recent data enables us to obtain updated estimates of the relationship between 
plastic money use and tax compliance. 
Using a fixed effects panel data estimation and IV techniques on 26 EU countries from 
2000 to 2016, we find that card payments statistically positively affect tax revenue collection 
efficiency. At the antipodes of Hondriayiannis and Papaiokonomou (2018), the OLS result 
confirms Madzharova (2014) and Immordino and Russo (2018), who find that plastic money use 
does translate into more VAT revenue collection in a naïve OLS regression. Besides, this study 
corroborates Madzharova (2014) and Immordino and Russo’s (2018) finding that ATM cash 




our approach provides a more adequate assessment of the relationship between plastic money use 
and VAT compliance gap by dealing simultaneously with both means of payments. We also 
explore a potential endogeneity problem inherent to the choice of a specific means of 
transactions, which could bias our cross-country analysis. In line with Immordino and Russo 
(2018), we find evidence of the effect of credit and debit card payments on VAT compliance 
gap. These results suggest that the increased use of plastic money led to gains in consumption tax 
compliance. 
To completely close the debate on this topic, a future research program would require 
micro-level data or administrative records. In other fields, it has been documented that 
aggregate-level analyses might be limited in power to estimate statistically significant effects 
(Black et al., 2019). In addition, it would be interesting to explore the impact of the spike in the 
use of electronic forms of payments due to the exogenous shift in norms in response to COVID-
19 that imposes confinement and social distancing. To investigate this, updated VAT gap 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
 
  
Variables Source Max Min Mean Std. Dev. N 
VAT gap (in EUR million) 2018 TAXUD report 40,424 20 5,630.30 8,652.70 442 
VAT gap as percent of VTTL 2018 TAXUD report 49 0 16.4522 10.2644 442 
VAT gap as percent of GDP 2018 TAXUD report 7.9 0 1.5903 1.2437 442 
Card payments over GDP European Central Bank 0.46 0.001 0.11 0.08 437 
ATM cash withdrawals over GDP European Central Bank 0.30 0.01 0.13 0.06 413 
Share (%) of whole and retail sale in 
VA Eurostat 32.35 10.03 20.85 3.64 442 
Share (%) of real estate in VA Eurostat 19.13 4.91 9.34 2.46 442 
Share (%) of construction in VA Eurostat 12.66 1.02 6.22 1.71 442 
Share (%) of industry in VA Eurostat 38.58 6.15 21.33 5.6 442 
Share (%) of telecommunication in VA Eurostat 10.59 3.02 4.84 1.07 442 
Share (%) of arts in VA Eurostat 14.57 1.4 3.07 1.41 442 
Dispersion of tax rates 
Authors, 2018 TAXUD 
report 0.12 0 0.07 0.03 442 
Scale of the tax administration OECD 0.01 0 0 0 304 
IT expenditure over total administrative 
costs OECD 0.29 0 0.1 0.07 208 
Unemployment rate (%) Eurostat 27.5 1.8 8.86 4.35 442 
Government effectiveness index World Bank 2.35 -0.37 1.17 0.62 416 
Age structure (%) Eurostat 43.2 25.7 35.15 3.37 442 
Deficit to GDP ratio Eurostat 6.9 -32.1 -2.65 3.66 442 
GDP per capita (in EUR) Eurostat 91,300 1,800 23,655.91 16,068.98 440 




Table A2: Fixed-effect Panel Regression Estimates of VAT Gap on Plastic Money Use Including 
CEE Country Indicator 
  Log(VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP VAT gap as % of VTTL 
Log(Card payments over GDP) -0.0553 -0.1856 -0.4587 -0.8645 2.3568 -0.5891 
 (0.529) (0.523) (0.776) (0.737) (7.270) (6.340) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) squared 0.0297 -0.0642 -0.2489 -0.5073** -0.4717 -2.5960 
 (0.117) (0.133) (0.167) (0.235) (1.721) (1.942) 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 3.4765** 3.3215** 2.7128** 2.2665* 35.0636** 31.5588** 
 (1.505) (1.492) (1.241) (1.202) (12.613) (12.318) 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) squared 0.7002** 0.6743** 0.5783** 0.5061** 7.0499*** 6.4650*** 
 (0.296) (0.296) (0.220) (0.213) (2.297) (2.259) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) x CEE dummy  -0.4156  -1.0392  -9.3953 
  (0.538)  (0.843)  (7.977) 
Share (%) of whole and retail sale in VA 0.0137 0.0061 0.0917 0.0724 0.8464 0.6766 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.082) (0.082) (0.703) (0.680) 
Share (%) of real estate in VA -0.0899* -0.0922* -0.0730 -0.0747 -1.2876* -1.3392* 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.072) (0.068) (0.684) (0.656) 
Share (%) of arts in VA 0.1086 0.1169 0.2372*** 0.2680*** 1.4238* 1.6126** 
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.060) (0.060) (0.743) (0.732) 
Dispersion of tax rates -2.8626 -2.5490 3.4746 4.3139 16.2539 23.3437 
 (2.527) (2.445) (4.352) (4.177) (32.814) (30.402) 
Unemployment rate (15-74 years) 0.0693 0.0739* 0.0988** 0.1073*** 1.0172*** 1.1205*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037) (0.318) (0.325) 
Government effectiveness index -0.5951 -0.5540 -0.1988 -0.0839 -3.9275 -2.9994 
 (0.546) (0.542) (0.394) (0.353) (4.188) (3.777) 
Age structure 0.0374 0.0229 0.1356* 0.1076 1.2861* 0.9581 
 (0.080) (0.082) (0.076) (0.068) (0.709) (0.635) 
Lagged IT expenditures 3.3629 3.7008 -0.6248 0.1570 -21.3207 -13.6803 
 (2.362) (2.614) (3.488) (3.803) (29.015) (32.105) 
Lagged scale of the tax administration 891.3981 944.0814 905.6849 1,002.8408 6,220.1269 7,411.2015 
 (646.483) (647.697) (827.461) (836.666) (7,180.280) (7,452.016) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0301 -0.0318 -0.0155 -0.0213 -0.1598 -0.2001 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.023) (0.023) (0.254) (0.240) 
Log(GDP per capita) 2.6903** 2.7902**   17.4242 19.6846* 
 (1.219) (1.225)   (10.661) (10.851) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.461 0.462 0.492 0.504 0.516 0.523 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, share 
of telecommunications in VA, lagged IT expenditures squared, lagged scale of the tax administration squared, 




Table A3: Panel Regression Estimates of VAT Gaps on Plastic Money Use Controlling for 
CEE Country-by-Year Fixed Effects 
  Log(VAT gap) VAT gap as % of GDP VAT gap as % of VTTL 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 4.2707*** 3.8698** 3.1006** 2.6182* 39.3340*** 35.1485** 
 (1.416) (1.489) (1.316) (1.428) (12.432) (13.413) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) -0.2407 -0.2860 -0.6271 -0.6816 -1.4397 -1.9125 
 (0.723) (0.628) (0.956) (0.917) (7.892) (7.395) 
Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) squared 0.8628*** 0.8085*** 0.6357** 0.5705** 7.8733*** 7.3069*** 
 (0.281) (0.288) (0.234) (0.246) (2.274) (2.380) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) squared -0.0276 -0.2452 -0.2669 -0.5288* -1.4501 -3.7220 
 (0.135) (0.177) (0.214) (0.301) (1.722) (2.391) 
Log(Card payments over GDP) x CEE dummy  -1.3990*  -1.6834  -14.6070 
  (0.713)  (1.322)  (11.312) 
Share (%) of whole and retail sale in VA 0.0566 0.0358 0.1044 0.0793 1.1235 0.9058 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.083) (0.086) (0.735) (0.751) 
Share (%) of real estate in VA -0.0596 -0.0592 -0.0735 -0.0730 -1.1014 -1.0973 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.072) (0.069) (0.687) (0.667) 
Share (%) of arts in VA 0.1506** 0.1839** 0.1974** 0.2375** 1.7076** 2.0558** 
 (0.068) (0.073) (0.082) (0.096) (0.804) (0.858) 
Dispersion of tax rates -3.5513 -4.1481 6.5405 5.8225 30.0383 23.8076 
 (3.010) (3.002) (4.663) (4.527) (38.318) (37.069) 
Unemployment rate 0.1110** 0.1205** 0.1023** 0.1137** 1.2425*** 1.3416*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.045) (0.047) (0.438) (0.455) 
Government effectiveness index -0.6503 -0.6541 -0.2187 -0.2233 -3.7692 -3.8094 
 (0.542) (0.544) (0.367) (0.358) (3.857) (3.782) 
Age structure 0.1921** 0.1618* 0.0901 0.0537 2.0319*** 1.7153*** 
 (0.071) (0.081) (0.079) (0.077) (0.581) (0.598) 
Lagged IT expenditures 5.3536* 5.2513* 3.6539 3.5308 9.3088 8.2400 
 (2.781) (2.786) (4.625) (4.640) (38.692) (39.033) 
Lagged scale of the tax administration 1,056.7645 1,118.4463 1,152.4190 1,226.6364 7,670.7173 8,314.7183 
 (691.286) (702.277) (918.033) (944.431) (8,303.713) (8,573.320) 
Deficit to GDP ratio -0.0420 -0.0407 -0.0159 -0.0143 -0.2622 -0.2481 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.023) (0.021) (0.245) (0.227) 
Log(GDP per capita) 3.1385*** 3.2531*** 1.1930 1.3309 20.4262* 21.6226** 
 (1.058) (1.066) (0.990) (1.001) (10.298) (10.475) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEE country-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, 
share of telecommunications in VA, lagged IT expenditures squared, lagged scale of the tax administration squared, 





Table 4A: First Stage IV Regression Results 
  Log(Card payments over GDP) Log(ATM cash withdrawals over GDP) 
      
Log(# ATM per inhabitant) 0.4780*** 0.8318*** 
 (0.132) (0.147) 
Broadband 0.0588** -0.0271 
 (0.026) (0.035) 
Log(# ATM per inhabitant)*Broadband -0.0112** 0.0029 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
   
R-squared 0.833 0.590 
Observations 406 399 
Number of countries 25 25 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 19.76 13.27 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F 16.50 8.184 
Hansen J 0.0747 0.326 
Prob > J 0.785 0.568 
C test of endogeneity 18.35 26.75 
Prob > C 0.0001 0.0000 
Notes: The following regressors are omitted from presentation: share of whole and retail sale in VA, share of real 
estate in VA, share of construction in VA, share of industry in VA, share of telecommunications in VA, share of arts, 
dispersion rate, unemployment rate, age structure, deficit to GDP ratio, log(population), log(GDP per capita), and the 
constant term. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
